

1 Andrew H. Wilson
2 WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO
3 235 Montgomery Street
4 Suite 450
5 San Francisco, California 94104
6 (415) 391-3900

7 Laurie J. Bartilson
8 BOWLES & MOXON
9 6255 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 2000
10 Hollywood, CA 90028
11 (213) 953-3360

12 Attorneys for Plaintiff
13 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
14 INTERNATIONAL

RECEIVED

MAY 20 1994

HUB LAW OFFICES.

15 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

16 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

17 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
18 INTERNATIONAL, a California not-
19 for-profit religious corporation,

20 Plaintiff,

21 vs.

22 GERALD ARMSTRONG; THE GERALD
23 ARMSTRONG CORPORATION, a
24 California for-profit corporation;
25 DOES 2 through 25, inclusive,

26 Defendants.

27 AND RELATED CROSS-COMPLAINT

) CASE NO. BC 052395

) NOTICE OF RULING

) DATE: NONE

) TIME: NONE

) DEPT: 30

) DISCOVERY CUT-OFF: None

) MOTION CUT-OFF: None

) TRIAL DATE: Vacated

28 TO THE COURT AND ALL ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 16, 1994, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, issued an opinion AFFIRMING the issuance of the preliminary injunction in the above-entitled matter. A true and correct copy of the opinion is

1 attached hereto as Exhibit A.

2 This notice is given pursuant to the Court's Order of March
3 23, 1994, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

4 Plaintiff requests that the stay of proceedings granted on
5 March 23, 1994 be dissolved, a status conference be set for the
6 earliest possible date, and this matter be re-set for trial.

7 Dated: May 18, 1994

Respectfully submitted,

8 Andrew H. Wilson
9 WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO

10 BOWLES & MOXON

11
12 By: 
13 Laurie J. Bartilson

14 Attorneys for Plaintiff,
15 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
16 INTERNATIONAL
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

EXHIBIT A

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL,)
Plaintiff and Respondent,)
v.)
GERALD ARMSTRONG,)
Defendant and Appellant.)

No. B069450
(Super.Ct.No. BC052395)

COURT OF APPEAL - SECOND DIST.

FILED

MAY 15 1984

JOSEPH J. LAKE Clerk
..... Deputy Clerk

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ronald M. Sohigian, Judge. Affirmed.

Ford Greene and Paul Morantz for Defendant and
Appellant.

Bowles & Moxon, Karen D. Holly, Wilson, Ryan &
Campilongo, Andrew H. Wilson, Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard,
Krinsky & Lieberman, Eric M. Lieberman, and Michael Lee
Hertzberg for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant Gerald Armstrong (Armstrong) appeals from an order granting a preliminary injunction restraining Armstrong from voluntarily giving assistance to other persons litigating or intending to litigate claims against plaintiff and respondent Church of Scientology International (Church).

The injunction was granted to enforce a settlement agreement in prior litigation between Armstrong and Church. In the settlement, Armstrong agreed he would not voluntarily assist other persons in proceedings against Church.

Armstrong does not deny violating his agreement but asserts numerous reasons why his agreement should not be enforceable. We conclude that the narrowly-limited preliminary injunction, which did not finally adjudicate the merits of Armstrong's claims, was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to make orders maintaining the status quo and preventing irreparable harm pending the ultimate resolution of the merits.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Armstrong was a member of Church between 1969 and 1981. He became an insider of high rank, familiar with Church practices and documents. He became disillusioned and left Church in 1981. When he left, he took many Church documents with him.

The Prior Action and Settlement

Church brought the prior action against Armstrong seeking return of the documents, injunctive relief against further dissemination of information contained in them, and imposition of a constructive trust. Mary Sue Hubbard, wife of Church founder L. Ron Hubbard, intervened asserting various torts against Armstrong. Armstrong filed a cross-complaint seeking damages for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, breach of contract, and tortious interference with contract.

Church's complaint and Hubbard's complaint in intervention were tried in 1984 by Judge Breckenridge. That trial led to a judgment, eventually affirmed on appeal, holding Armstrong's conversion of the documents was justified because he believed the conversion necessary to protect himself from Church's claims that he had lied about Church matters and L. Ron Hubbard. (Church of Scientology v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1063, 1073.)

Armstrong's cross-complaint in that case was settled in December 1986 by the settlement agreement which is the subject of the injunction in the present case.

In the settlement agreement, the parties mutually released each other from all claims, except the then-pending appeal of Judge Breckenridge's decision on Church's complaint, which was expressly excluded. The settlement involved a number

of persons engaged in litigation against Church, all represented by Attorney Michael Flynn. As a result of the settlement, Armstrong was paid \$800,000. Armstrong's cross-complaint was dismissed with prejudice, as agreed, on December 11, 1986.

The portions of the settlement agreement most pertinent to this appeal are paragraphs 7-G, 7-H, and 10, in which Armstrong agreed not to voluntarily assist other persons intending to engage in litigation or other activities adverse to Church.^{1/}

1. "G. Plaintiff agrees that he will not voluntarily assist or cooperate with any person adverse to Scientology in, any proceeding against any of the Scientology organizations, individuals, or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above. Plaintiff also agrees that he will not cooperate in any manner with any organizations aligned against Scientology. [¶] H. Plaintiff agrees not to testify or otherwise participate in any other judicial, administrative or legislative proceeding adverse to Scientology or any of the Scientology Churches, individuals or entities listed in Paragraph 1 above unless compelled to do so by lawful subpoena or other lawful process. Plaintiff shall not make himself amenable to service of any such subpoena in a manner which invalidates the intent of this provision. Unless required to do so by such subpoena, Plaintiff agrees not to discuss this litigation or his experiences with and knowledge of the Church with anyone other than members of his immediate family. As provided hereinafter in Paragraph 18(d), the contents of this Agreement may not be disclosed. [¶] . . . 10. Plaintiff agrees that he will not assist or advise anyone, including individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, or governmental agencies contemplating any claim or engaged in litigation or involved in or contemplating any activity adverse to the interests of any entity or class of persons listed above in Paragraph 1 of this Agreement."

Paragraph 20 of the agreement authorizes its enforcement by injunction.

The Present Action

In February 1992, Church filed a complaint in the present action alleging Armstrong's violation of the settlement agreement and seeking damages and injunctive relief.

In support of its motion for a preliminary injunction, Church presented evidence that since June 1991 Armstrong had violated the agreement by working as a paralegal for attorneys representing clients engaged in litigation against Church and by voluntarily and gratuitously providing evidence for such litigation. Armstrong worked as a paralegal for Attorney Joseph Yanny, who represented Richard and Vicki Aznaran in a multimillion dollar suit against Church in federal court. Armstrong also voluntarily provided declarations for use in the Aznarans' case. Armstrong thereafter worked for Attorney Ford Greene on the Aznaran and other Church related matters.

Armstrong did not deny the charged conduct but asserted the settlement agreement was not enforceable for various reasons, primarily that it was against public policy and that he signed it under duress.

The Trial Court's Preliminary Injunction

The trial court granted a limited preliminary injunction, with exceptions which addressed Armstrong's

argument that the settlement agreement violated public policy by requiring suppression of evidence in judicial proceedings.

The court found that Armstrong voluntarily entered the settlement agreement for which he received substantial compensation, and that Armstrong was unlikely to prevail on his duress claim. The court found that Armstrong could contract as part of the settlement to refrain from exercising various rights which he would otherwise have. Balancing the interim harms to the parties, the court found that to the extent of the limited acts covered by the preliminary injunction, Church would suffer irreparable harm which could not be compensated by monetary damages, and harm for which monetary damages would be difficult to calculate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subds. (a)(2), (a)(4), (a)(5).)

The court's order provides, in pertinent part:

"Application for preliminary injunction is granted in part, in the following respects only. [¶] Defendant Gerald Armstrong, his agents, and persons acting in concert or conspiracy with him (excluding attorneys at law who are not said defendant's agents or retained by him) are restrained and enjoined during the pendency of this suit pending further order of court from doing directly or indirectly any of the following: [¶] Voluntarily assisting any person (not a governmental organ or entity) intending to make, intending to press, intending to arbitrate, or intending to litigate a claim against the persons

referred to in sec. 1 of the 'Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement' of December, 1986 regarding such claim or regarding pressing, arbitrating, or litigating it. [¶]
Voluntarily assisting any person (not a governmental organ or entity) arbitrating or litigating a claim against the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the 'Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement' of December, 1986."

The court provided the following exceptions to address Armstrong's public policy arguments: "The court does not intend by the foregoing to prohibit defendant Armstrong from: (a) being reasonably available for the service of subpoenas on him; (b) accepting service of subpoenas on him without physical resistance, obstructive tactics, or flight; (c) testifying fully and fairly in response to properly put questions either in deposition, at trial, or in other legal or arbitration proceedings; (d) properly reporting or disclosing to authorities criminal conduct of the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the 'Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement' of December, 1986; or (e) engaging in gainful employment rendering clerical or paralegal services not contrary to the terms and conditions of this order."

/

/

/

/

DISCUSSION

The grant of a preliminary injunction does not adjudicate the ultimate rights in controversy between the parties. It merely determines that the court, balancing the relative equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should be restrained from exercising the right claimed. The purpose of the injunction is to preserve the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.)

The court considers two interrelated factors. The first is the likelihood the plaintiff will prevail at trial. The second is the interim harm the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied, as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the injunction is granted. (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286.)

The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests in the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an appellate court's review on appeal from the granting of a preliminary injunction is very limited. The burden is on the appellant to make a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69; Nutro Products, Inc. v. Cole Grain Co. (1992) 3

Cal.App.4th 860, 865.) Abuse of discretion means the trial court has exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 69.)

Here, the trial court's memorandum decision reflects very careful consideration of the factors relevant to the granting of a preliminary injunction. The court weighed the relative harms to the parties and balanced the interests asserted by Armstrong. The court granted a limited preliminary injunction with exclusions protecting the countervailing interests asserted by Armstrong. We find no abuse of discretion. We cannot say that the trial court erred as a matter of law in weighing the hardships or in determining there is a reasonable probability Church would ultimately prevail to the limited extent reflected by the terms of the preliminary injunction.

Although Armstrong's "freedom of speech" is affected, it is clear that a party may voluntarily by contract agree to limit his freedom of speech. (See In re Steinberg (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 14, 18-20 [filmmaker agreed to prior restraint on distribution of film]; ITT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 307, 319 [employee's agreement not to disclose confidential information; "it is possible to waive even First Amendment free speech rights by contract"]; Snepp v. United States (1980) 444 U.S. 507, 509, fn. 3 [book by CIA

employee subject to prepublication clearance by terms of his employment contract].)

The exceptions in the trial court's injunction assured that the injunction would not serve to suppress evidence in legal proceedings. The injunction expressly did not restrain Armstrong from accepting service of subpoenas, testifying fully and fairly in legal proceedings, and reporting criminal conduct to the authorities. (See Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. v. Chuidian (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1081-1082.) This contrasts with the stipulation in Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 308, 315-316, cited by Armstrong, which prevented a party from disclosing misconduct to regulatory authorities.

This appeal is only from the granting of a preliminary injunction which expressly did not decide the ultimate merits. As limited by the trial court here, the preliminary injunction merely restrains, for the time being, Armstrong's voluntary intermeddling in other litigation against Church, in violation of his own agreement. We decline any extended discussion of Armstrong's shotgun-style brief, which offers more than a dozen separate contentions against enforcement. It suffices to say that Armstrong has not borne his burden on appeal to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION

The order granting a preliminary injunction is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

VOGEL (C.S.), Acting P.J.

We concur:

HASTINGS, J.

KLEIN (Brett), J.*

*Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

EXHIBIT B

1 Ford Greene, Esquire
California State Bar No. 107601
2 HUB LAW OFFICES
711 Sir Francis Drake Boulevard
3 San Anselmo, California 94960-1949
Telephone: (415) 258-0360

4 PAUL MORANTZ, ESQ.
5 P.O. Box 511
Pacific Palisades, CA 90272
6 (310) 459-4745

7 Attorneys for Defendant
GERALD ARMSTRONG
8
9

10 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
12

13 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY)
14 INTERNATIONAL, a California)
not-for-profit religious)
15 corporation;)

16 Plaintiffs,)

17 vs.)

18 GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1)
through 25, inclusive,)

19 Defendants.)
20)

No. BC 052395

**NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANT
ARMSTRONG'S MOTION FOR STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS**

Discovery Cut Off: Vacated
Motion Cut Off: Vacated
Trial Date: Vacated

21
22 On March 23, 1993, the motion by Defendant Gerald Armstrong
23 for a stay of proceedings, or in the alternative, for an extension
24 of time to oppose motions for summary adjudication, came before
25 Department 30 of the above-entitled Court, the Honorable David A.
26 Horowitz, presiding. Plaintiff Church of Scientology
27 International was represented by Wilson, Ryan & Campilongo, Andrew
28 H. Wilson appearing, and by Bowles & Moxon, Laurie J. Bartilson

COPY

1 appearing. Defendant Gerald Armstrong was represented by Ford
2 Greene. After consideration of all the papers filed in support of
3 and in opposition to Defendant Armstrong's motion and after
4 considering the arguments of counsel, the Court ordered as
5 follows:


6 1. Defendant's motion for stay of proceedings in Department
7 30 of the trial court is GRANTED on the grounds set forth in the
8 Court's Minute Order issued March 23, 1993, a true and correct
9 copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by
10 reference.

11 2. Counsel are ORDERED to report, in writing, any decision
12 by the Court of Appeal to Department 30 within one day of the
13 issuance of the opinion on Defendant Armstrong's appeal of the
14 preliminary injunction issued by the Honorable Ronald M. Sohigian
15 on May 28, 1992.

16 3. Any and all matters set in Department 30, including but
17 not limited to the motions set for March 31, 1993, the Final
18 Status Conference of April 23, 1993, and Trial of May 3, 1993, are
19 advanced and VACATED.

20 4. Defendant is to give notice.

21 DATED: March 26, 1993

22
23 By: 
24 FORD GREENE

25
26 By: _____

PAUL MORANTZ

27 Attorneys for Defendant
28

PROOF OF SERVICE

I am employed in the County of Marin, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a party to the above entitled action. My business address is 711 Sir Francis Drake Boulevard, San Anselmo, California. I served the following documents: NOTICE OF RULING ON DEFENDANT ARMSTRONG'S MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS on the following person(s) on the date set forth below, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the United States Mail at San Anselmo, California:

Andrew Wilson, Esquire
WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO
235 Montgomery Street, Suite 450
San Francisco, California 94104

LAURIE J. BARTILSON, ESQ.
Bowles & Moxon
6255 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 2000
Los Angeles, California 90028

PAUL MORANTZ, ESQ.
P.O. Box 511
Pacific Palisades, CA 90272

[x] (By Mail) I caused such envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the United States Mail at San Anselmo, California.

[x] (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

DATED: March 26, 1993



SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA , COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Date: March 23, 1993

Honorable DAVID A. HOROWITZ

, Judge
, Deputy Sheriff
, C. S. L.

S. ROBLES

B. CHARLINE HOWELL

, Deputy Clerk
, Reporter
, E/R Monitor

8 C. AGUIRRE

BC052395

(Parties and Counsel checked if present)

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, ETC

Counsel For LAURIE BARTILSON (x)
Plaintiff ANDREW WILSON (x)

VS

GERALD ARMSTRONG

Counsel For FORD GREENE (x)
Defendant

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:

MOTION OF DEFENDANT, GERALD ARMSTRONG, FOR STAY OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO OPPOSE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION;

D, Mot for stay of proceedings GRANTED. The action is stayed under CCP 916. Counsel are ordered to report any decision by the Court of Appeal to this Department, in writing, within one day of the issuance of the opinion so that this Court may lift the stay.

"...an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby..." CCP 916. As the Church has stated in its Summary Adjudication motions, "The facts are undisputed, however, that Armstrong has breached the Agreement repeatedly and deliberately. Because of these breaches, a preliminary injunction was issued by the Court on May 28, 1992." Obviously, the validity of the Agreement is the basis for the preliminary injunction. One of the basis for the appeal is an attack on the legality and validity of the Agreement.

The central issue of this case is the legality and validity of the Agreement. The Court of Appeal could certainly reach that issue in its determination of the validity of the injunction. If it does, that ruling could be determinative of many of the issues of this case. It makes no sense to proceed with this matter until the Court of Appeal makes its ruling.

Any and all matters set in this department, including but not limited to the Motions set for 3/31/93, the Final Status Conference of 4/23/93 and the Trial of 5/3/93, are each advanced and vacated.

Defendant shall give notice.

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY

LAW OFFICES OF

JAMES M. HARRIS

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES)

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action. My business address is 6255 Sunset Boulevard, Suite 2000, Los Angeles, CA 90028.

On May 18, 1994 I served the foregoing document described as NOTICE OF RULING on interested parties in this action,

[] by placing the true copies thereof in sealed envelopes as stated on the attached mailing list;

[X] by placing [] the original [X] true copies thereof in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

PAUL MORANTZ
P.O. Box 511
Pacific Palisades, CA 90272

FORD GREENE **FAX AND MAIL**
HUB Law Offices
711 Sir Francis Drake Blvd.
San Anselmo, CA 94960-1949

[X] BY MAIL

[] *I deposited such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.

[X] As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing an affidavit.

Executed on May 18, 1994 at Los Angeles, California.

[] **(BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered such

envelopes by hand to the offices of the addressees.

Executed on _____, at Los Angeles, California.

☒ (State) I declare under penalty of the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

☐ (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.

Print or Type Name

Signature

* (By Mail, signature must be of person depositing envelope in mail slot, box or bag)

** (For personal service signature must be that of messenger)